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stage, 2 × 2 games (and provides a basis for possibly greater scope in more general games).
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1 Introduction
Strategic complements are well understood for normal form games, but less so for ex-
tensive form games. Indeed, Echenique (2004) identifies a potential concern about the
possibility of strategic complements in extensive form games. Using a natural definition
(each player’s payoff function satisfies standard notions of quasisupermodularity and sin-
gle crossing property in every subgame), he gives several examples showing that games
that should intuitively exhibit strategic complementarities do not satisfy this definition.
He also gives examples of simple extensive form games that cannot be made into extensive
form games with strategic complements. He concludes that extensive form games with
strategic complementarities are a very restrictive class of games.
We study necessary and sufficient conditions for strategic complements (defined as
increasing best responses) in two stage, 2× 2 games. These are games with two players,
two actions for each player, and two stages of play, sometimes denoted 2 × 2 × 2 games.
Such games are a building block for multi-stage games and repeated games. We apply the
standard framework. In the first stage, two players play a 2 × 2 game. After observing
the outcome, they play another 2 × 2 game in the second stage and payoffs are realized
for each possible outcome. There are sixteen terminal nodes (four outcomes in the first
stage, and for each outcome in the first stage, four outcomes in the second stage). The
payoff for each player is characterized by an ordered tuple in R16, and the set of all two
stage, 2× 2 games is identified naturally with R16×R16. We use Euclidean topology and
Lebesgue measure on this space.
We find that the restrictiveness imposed by the standard sufficient conditions of qua-
sisupermodularity and single crossing property is particularly severe, in the sense that
the set of two stage, 2× 2 games in which payoffs satisfy these conditions has (Lebesgue)
measure zero in the set of all two stage, 2× 2 games (identified with R16 ×R16). Indeed,
these conditions imply that each player must be indifferent between their actions in two
of the four subgames in stage two, eliminating any strategic role for their actions in these
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two subgames.
On the other hand, we find that necessary conditions for strategic complements are
much weaker, in the sense that the set of two stage, 2×2 games with strategic complements
(increasing best responses) has infinite (Lebesgue) measure in the set of all two stage,
2×2 games.1 This enlarges the scope of strategic complements in this class of games (and
provides a basis for possibly greater scope in more general extensive form games).
The results here are based on a detailed study of strategic complements in two stage,
2 × 2 games, and a characterization of when a player exhibits strategic complements in
such games. As steps in the development of the main results, we show that strategic
complements imply a particular structure for best choices in the first and second stage
games. A careful analysis of best responses both on and off the path of play helps to
identify necessary implications of strategic complements in three different scenarios. This
is important to characterize strategic complements. The conditions we identify are easy
to formulate in terms of individual player payoffs and yield (uncountably) many new
extensive form games with strategic complements.
The notion of subgame strategic complements used here is consistent with the notion
of increasing extended best responses in Echenique (2004), and therefore, his result that
the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice continues to
hold in the larger class of games considered here, further expanding the scope of strategic
complements techniques and results in extensive form games.
One could convert the extensive form game into a 16 × 16 normal form game and
investigate strategic complements in that setting. We don’t do this for the usual reason
that this would collapse the dynamic structure of the model, which is a motivating feature
for our work, and it would allow for Nash equilibria that are not subgame perfect.
1Notably, such a distinction does not hold for normal form games in general, as can be shown readily
for the case of 2 × 2 games, where the set of games in which payoffs satisfy quasisupermodularity and
single crossing properties has infinite (Lebesgue) measure.
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As is well known, in one shot 2×2matrix games, the role of strategic complements may
be larger, because a 2×2 matrix game with strategic substitutes may be transformed into
a game with strategic complements by reversing the order on the actions of one player. In
other words, it is useful to know if our results remain true when we include the larger set
of payoffs that include those sufficient for strategic substitutes. We show this is indeed
the case. In other words, the set of games in which payoffs satisfy standard sufficient
conditions for either strategic complements or strategic substitutes has measure zero, but
the set of games in which best responses are either increasing or decreasing has infinite
measure.
We explore the case of games with three players, two actions for each player, and two
stages overall, denoted 3 × 2 × 2 games. In the first stage, three players play a 3 × 2
game. After observing the outcome, they play another 3× 2 game in stage two. Payoffs
are realized at the terminal nodes. There are sixty four terminal nodes (eight outcomes in
the first stage game, and for each outcome in the first stage, eight outcomes in the second
stage). The payoff for each player is characterized by an ordered tuple in R64, and the set
of all 3× 2× 2 games is identified naturally with R64 ×R64 ×R64 (or equivalently, R192).
We use Euclidean topology and Lebesgue measure on this space.
We find that the restrictiveness imposed by sufficient conditions of quasisupermodu-
larity and single crossing property is even more severe here, in the sense that not only the
set of 3 × 2 × 2 games in which payoffs satisfy these conditions has (Lebesgue) measure
zero in the set of all 3×2×2 games, but more surprisingly, each player must be indifferent
between their actions in six of the eight subgames in stage two, eliminating any strategic
role for their actions in these six subgames. This shows that quasisupermodularity and
single crossing property conditions restrict payoffs to R40 × R40 × R40 (or equivalently,
R
120).
On the other hand, we show with a class of examples that strategic complements
(increasing best responses) in 3× 2× 2 games allow for strategic interaction in six of the
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eight subgames. More generally, increasing best responses allow for payoffs in a set of
infinite measure in R56 × R56 × R56 (or equivalently, R168).
As is well known, the problem of characterizing strategic complements in general
extensive form games remains intractable. Some of the difficulties involved can be seen
in our work. In order to have tractable models, sufficient conditions have been shown for
particular classes of games, for example, those with a recursive framework (like repeated
games) and using more specialized strategies like Markov strategies and conditions on
transition probabilities, as described in Amir (1996) and Curtat (1996). This has been
developed further by Vives (2009) and Balbus, Reffett, and Woźny (2014), providing
the reader with a flavor of the complexities involved. Walker, Wooders, and Amir (2011)
provide results for two player, extensive form, binary Markov games such as tennis matches
where monotonicity properties are helpful to identify predicted Nash equilbria.
As two stage, 2×2 games are a basic building block for multi-stage games and infinitely
repeated games, our results may provide insight to other researchers to explore more
general cases. In particular, our results show the need to go beyond the natural and direct
adaptation of quasisupermodularity and single crossing property as used in Echenique
(2004).
In order to present ideas more concretely, we consider an explicit example in the next
section. Section 3 defines the general framework and presents the main result character-
izing strategic complements. Section 4 formalizes the connection to Echenique (2004),
section 5 contains the results for three player games, and section 6 concludes.
2 Motivating Example
Consider an industry with two firms using production technologies with spillovers that
provide an incentive for firms to coordinate on technology choice.
In stage 1, the two firms are considering to use an existing technology (A0
1
for firm
4
P2
B0
1
B0
2
P1
A0
1
3, 3
(1)
1,−3
(2)
A0
2
−3, 1
(3)
−4,−4
(4)
Table 1: Stage 1 Game
1, B0
1
for firm 2), or invest in an expensive new technology (A0
2
for firm 1, B0
2
for firm
2) that may, perhaps, scale better in the future. Staying with the cheaper technology is
profitable at present and there is a stage 1 loss in going with the expensive technology.
If one firm invests in the new technology, the other enjoys a spillover gain. If both firms
invest, there is overinvestment leading to larger stage 1 losses for both firms. Payoffs are
given in table 1. Assume that A0
1
≺ A0
2
and B0
1
≺ B0
2
.
For each of the four outcomes in stage 1, there is a corresponding stage 2 game,
indexed by the number in the top right hand corner of each cell in table 1, and given
by the normal form in table 2. In each stage 2 game n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, each firm decides
whether to produce low (An
1
for firm 1, Bn
1
for firm 2) or produce high (An
2
for firm 1, Bn
2
for firm 2). Assume that for each stage 2 game n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, An
1
≺ An
2
and Bn
1
≺ Bn
2
.
For notational convenience, payoffs are assumed to be discounted payoffs. The payoffs
given in table 2 may be motivated as follows.
If the outcome in stage 1 is (A0
1
, B0
1
), then both firms may continue with the existing
technology, produce less and make a higher profit. If one firm produces high and the
other produces low, the profits of the high firm suffer from the high cost of inefficient
cheaper technology, and due to spillovers, this also affects the profits of the low firm to
some extent. Both firms cannot produce high in the absence of the expensive technology.
If the outcome in stage 1 is (A0
1
, B0
2
), then it is strictly dominant for firm 2 to produce
high. Assuming large technological spillovers (perhaps because once invested, the better
techonology is easily available to others), it may be dominant for firm 1 to produce high
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(1) P2
B1
1
B1
2
P1
A1
1
15, 15 14, 5
A1
2
5, 14 0, 0
(3) P2
B3
1
B3
2
P1
A3
1
5, 5 10, 13
A3
2
13, 4 19, 14
(2) P2
B2
1
B2
2
P1
A2
1
5, 5 4, 13
A2
2
13, 10 14, 19
(4) P2
B4
1
B4
2
P1
A4
1
8, 8 0, 5
A4
2
5, 0 17, 17
Table 2: Stage 2 Games
as well. A similar scenario occurs with the roles of firm 1 and 2 reversed if the outcome
in stage 1 is (A0
2
, B0
1
).
If the outcome in stage 1 is (A0
2
, B0
2
), then both firms may produce high and there
is no signigicant benefit from technological spillovers. There is no benefit to a firm from
producing less if the other firm is producing more (perhaps because the low output firm is
crowded out, its more expensive technology is idle, and this may have a negative spillover
for the high firm). It remains somewhat profitable if both firms coordinate on low output.
The extensive form of the overall two stage game is depicted in figure 1. The payoff
at terminal nodes is sum of stage 1 payoff and stage 2 (discounted) payoff.
An alternative interpretation is in terms of brand marketing. In the first stage, each
firm considers whether to use an existing lower quality brand or spend more to promote
and develop a high quality brand. In the second stage, each firm decides whether to
produce the low brand or the high brand. Explanations similar to the ones above may be
used to motivate stage one and stage two payoffs.
In this two stage game, a strategy for player 1 is a 5-tuple s = (s0, s1, s2, s3, s4), where
for each n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, sn ∈ {An
1
, An
2
}. The strategy space for player 1 is the collection of
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Figure 1: Extensive Form of Motivating Example
all strategies, denoted S, and is endowed with the product order. It is a (complete) lattice
in the product order.2 Similarly, a strategy for player 2 is a 5-tuple t = (t0, t1, t2, t3, t4),
where for each n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, tn ∈ {Bn
1
, Bn
2
}. The strategy space for player 2 is the
collection of all strategies, denoted T , and is endowed with the product order. It is also
a (complete) lattice in the product order. We denote payoffs from a strategy profile (s, t)
by u1(s, t) for player 1 and u2(s, t) for player 2, as usual.
This makes the game into a lattice game (each player’s strategy space is a lattice), and
we can inquire if this game exhibits strategic complements. In other words, is the best
response of one player increasing (in the lattice set order)3 in the strategy of the other
player?
Notice that the component games are very well behaved in terms of monotone com-
parative statics. Each of the games 0, 1, 2, and 3 has a strictly dominant action for
each player, and game 4 is a classic coordination game with two strict Nash equilibria.
2We use standard lattice theoretic concepts. Useful references are Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and
Topkis (1998).
3See next section for the (standard) definition.
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Therefore, we may think that this is a game with strategic complements.
Indeed, as shown below in more generality, this game does exhibit strategic comple-
ments. Moreover, it is straightforward to check that this game has two subgame perfect
Nash equilibria, one given by sˆ∗ = (A0
1
, A1
1
, A2
2
, A3
2
, A4
1
) and tˆ∗ = (B0
1
, B1
1
, B2
2
, B3
2
, B4
1
), and
the other given by s˜∗ = (A0
1
, A1
1
, A2
2
, A3
2
, A4
2
) and t˜∗ = (B0
1
, B1
1
, B2
2
, B3
2
, B4
2
), and the set of
subgame perfect Nash equilibria is a complete lattice.
Nevertheless, this game does not satisfy the definition of an extensive form game
with strategic complementarities used in Echenique (2004). For example, the payoff
function of player 1 is not quasisupermodular.4 Consider sˆ = (A0
1
, A1
1
, A2
2
, A3
1
, A4
1
), s˜ =
(A0
2
, A1
1
, A2
1
, A3
1
, A4
1
), and tˆ = (B0
2
, B1
1
, B2
1
, B3
1
, B4
1
). In this case, player 1 payoff is u1(sˆ ∨
s˜, tˆ) = 4 = u1(s˜, tˆ), and therefore, quasisupermodularity implies 15 = u1(sˆ, tˆ) ≤ u1(sˆ ∧
s˜, tˆ) = 6, a contradiction.
As shown below in more detail, this example is one of a large class of two stage,
2× 2 games that exhibit strategic complements but do not satisfy the definition used in
Echenique (2004). The example shows that monotonicity may be helpful to study dynamic
coordination in games. It may be hard to verify for monotonicity directly, because each
player here has 32 strategies and we would need to compute best response set to each
opponent strategy and verify that it increases for each higher opponent strategy. Our
result (theorem 1 below) provides equivalent conditions on payoffs that are easy to apply
and automatically yield increasing best responses.
3 General Framework
Consider a general two stage, 2 × 2 game (denoted Γ). In the first stage, a 2 × 2 game
(denoted game 0) is played in which player 1 can take actions in {A0
1
, A0
2
} and player 2
can take actions in {B0
1
, B0
2
}. In the second stage, another 2×2 game is played depending
4See section 3 for the (standard) definition of a quasisupermodular function.
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Figure 2: General Two Stage, 2× 2 Game
on first stage outcome. If first stage outcome is (A0
1
, B0
1
), then game 1 is played, in which
player 1 can take actions in {A1
1
, A1
2
} and player 2 can take actions in {B1
1
, B1
2
}. If outcome
is (A0
1
, B0
2
), then game 2 is played, in which player 1 can take actions in {A2
1
, A2
2
} and
player 2 can take actions in {B2
1
, B2
2
}. If outcome is (A0
2
, B0
1
), then game 3 is played, in
which player 1 can take actions in {A3
1
, A3
2
} and player 2 can take actions in {B3
1
, B3
2
}. If
outcome is (A0
2
, B0
2
), then game 4 is played, in which player 1 can take actions in {A4
1
, A4
2
}
and player 2 can take actions in {B4
1
, B4
2
}. The extensive form of Γ is depicted in figure
2, with general payoffs at terminal nodes. When there is no confusion, we use the term
game for such a two stage, 2 × 2 game. The set of all such games is identified naturally
with R16 × R16. Throughout the paper, we view Euclidean space as a standard measure
space with the Borel sigma-algebra and Lebesgue measure.
In each component game of a two stage, 2 × 2 game, suppose action 1 is lower than
action 2, that is, for n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, An
1
≺ An
2
and Bn
1
≺ Bn
2
. A strategy for player 1 is a
5-tuple s = (s0, s1, s2, s3, s4), where for each n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, sn ∈ {An
1
, An
2
}. The strategy
space for player 1 is the collection of all strategies, denoted S, and is endowed with the
product order. Notice that S is a complete lattice in the product order. Similarly, a
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strategy for player 2 is a 5-tuple t = (t0, t1, t2, t3, t4), where for each n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
tn ∈ {Bn
1
, Bn
2
}. The strategy space for player 2 is the collection of all strategies, denoted
T , and is endowed with the product order. The strategy space T is a complete lattice
in the product order. This makes Γ into a lattice game (each player’s strategy space is a
lattice). We denote payoffs from a strategy profile (s, t) as u1(s, t) for player 1 and u2(s, t)
for player 2, as usual.
We shall formulate conditions under which such games exhibit strategic complements,
defined in terms of increasing best responses, as usual. Player 1 has strategic com-
plements , if best response of player 1, denoted BR1(t), is increasing in t in the lattice
set order (denoted ⊑).5 That is, ∀tˆ, t˜ ∈ T , tˆ  t˜ =⇒ BR1(tˆ) ⊑ BR1(t˜). Similarly, we
may define when player 2 has strategic complements . The game Γ is a game with
strategic complements , if both players exhibit strategic complements.
Notice that strategic complements is defined for best response sets in the overall game.
As shown by a closer analysis of examples in Echenique (2004) and in more detail here,
this is the hard case. When we want to include strategic complements in subgames, we
shall assume that second stage subgames exhibit strategic complements. As those are
standard 2×2 games, conditions under which they exhibit strategic complements are well
understood.
In the remainder of this section, we make the assumption that payoffs to different final
outcomes (in other words, at different terminal nodes) are different. Such a two stage, 2×2
game is termed a game with differential payoffs to outcomes . This assumption is
sufficient to prove the results in this paper. Theoretically, the set of two stage, 2×2 games
with differential payoffs to outcomes is open, dense, and has full (Lebesgue) measure6 in
R
16 × R16 (the set of all such games).
5The lattice set order is the standard set order on lattices: A ⊑ B means that ∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B,
a ∧ b ∈ A and a ∨ b ∈ B. It is sometimes termed the Veinott set order, or the strong set order.
6Recall that a set has full (Lebesgue) measure if its complement has (Lebesgue) measure zero. This
is different from a set with infinite (Lebesgue) measure.
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Differential payoffs to outcomes has the following implications for the structure of best
responses. For every t ∈ T , and for every sˆ, s˜ ∈ BR1(t), the subgame reached on the path
of play for profile (sˆ, t) is the same as the subgame reached on the path of play for profile
(s˜, t). Moreover, the actions played by each player in the subgame reached on the path
of play for profile (sˆ, t) are the same as the actions played by each player in the subgame
reached on the path of play for profile (s˜, t). Furthermore, every s ∈ S that has the same
actions as sˆ on the path of play for profile (sˆ, t) is also a member of BR1(t). This is
helpful in the proof of the following results.
The next three lemmas are important because they give necessary implications of
strategic complements in the class of games studied here. Taken together they help to
characterize strategic complements, as shown in theorem 1 below.
Lemma 1. Consider a game with differential payoffs to outcomes and suppose player 1
exhibits strategic complements.
For every tˆ, t˜ ∈ T , for every sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ), and for every s˜ ∈ BR1(t˜), if tˆ0 = t˜0, then
sˆ0 = s˜0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that in the class of games considered here, strategic complements for
player 1 implies that if a fixed first stage action is part of player 1’s best response to tˆ,
then for every player 2 strategy t˜ that has the same first stage action as tˆ, every best
response of player 1 must play the same fixed first stage action, and therefore, necessarily
lead to the same subgame in stage two.
Lemma 2. Consider a game with differential payoffs to outcomes and suppose player 1
exhibits strategic complements.
(1) If there exists tˆ ∈ T and sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ) such that tˆ0 = B0
1
and sˆ0 = A0
2
, then for every
t ∈ T and for every s ∈ BR1(t), s0 = A0
2
.
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(2) If there exists tˆ ∈ T and sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ) such that tˆ0 = B0
2
and sˆ0 = A0
1
, then for every
t ∈ T and for every s ∈ BR1(t), s0 = A0
1
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Part (1) of this lemma shows that if playing the higher action in the first stage is ever
a best response of player 1 to player 2 playing the lower action in the first stage, then for
every player 2 strategy t, playing the higher action must be a best response of player 1.
Similarly, part (2) of this lemma shows that if playing the lower action in the first stage
is ever a best response of player 1 to player 2 playing the higher action in the first stage,
then for every player 2 strategy t, playing the lower action must be a best response of
player 1.
Lemma 3. Consider a game with differential payoffs to outcomes and suppose player 1
exhibits strategic complements.
(1) If there exists tˆ ∈ T and sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ) such that tˆ0 = B0
1
and sˆ0 = A0
1
, then for every
t ∈ T and for every s ∈ BR1(t), if t0 = B0
1
then s1 = A1
1
.
(2) If there exists tˆ ∈ T and sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ) such that tˆ0 = B0
1
and sˆ0 = A0
2
, then for every
t ∈ T and for every s ∈ BR1(t), if t0 = B0
1
then s3 = A3
1
.
(3) If there exists tˆ ∈ T and sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ) such that tˆ0 = B0
2
and sˆ0 = A0
2
, then for every
t ∈ T and for every s ∈ BR1(t), if t0 = B0
2
then s4 = A4
2
.
(4) If there exists tˆ ∈ T and sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ) such that tˆ0 = B0
2
and sˆ0 = A0
1
, then for every
t ∈ T and for every s ∈ BR1(t), if t0 = B0
2
then s2 = A2
2
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3 , building on lemmas 1 and 2, presents a very useful necessary implication
of strategic complements in this setting. Whenever a particular subgame is reached on
the best response path, lemma 3 locates the unique action that must be chosen in that
subgame to be consistent with strategic complements. For example, statement (1) says
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that if subgame 1 is ever on the best response path, then whenever there is a chance
to reach subgame 1 (that is, t0 = B0
1
), player 1 necessarily plays A0
1
(by lemma 1),
and therefore, subgame 1 must be reached, and moreover, player 1 must play A1
1
in
subgame 1. As the lemma covers all four possible cases, this helps to characterize strategic
complements in theorem 1 below. Notice that similar lemmas hold for player 2.
In order to make theorem 1 more accessible, it is useful to define when an action
dominates another action, not just in a given subgame, but across subgames as well. For
subgames m,n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and for action indices k, ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, action Am
k
dominates
action An
ℓ
, if regardless of which action player 2 plays in subgames m and n, action Am
k
in subgame m gives player 1 a higher payoff than An
ℓ
.
In particular, a statement of the form A1
1
dominates A1
2
means that player 1 payoffs
satisfy a1
1
> a1
3
and a1
2
> a1
4
, a statement of the form A1
1
dominates A3
1
means that
min{a1
1
, a1
2
} > max{a3
1
, a3
2
}, and a statement of the form A1
1
dominates A3
2
means that
min{a1
1
, a1
2
} > max{a3
3
, a3
4
}. Consequently, the statement A1
1
dominates A1
2
, A3
1
, and A3
2
is
equivalent to a1
1
> a1
3
, a1
2
> a1
4
, andmin{a1
1
, a1
2
} > max{a3
1
, a3
2
, a3
3
, a3
4
}. Similar equivalences
hold for the other conditions in the theorem. Here is the main theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider a game with differential payoffs to outcomes.
The following are equivalent.
1. Player 1 has strategic complements
2. Exactly one of the following holds
(a) A1
1
dominates A1
2
, A3
1
, and A3
2
, and A2
2
dominates A2
1
, A4
1
, and A4
2
(b) A1
1
dominates A1
2
, A3
1
, and A3
2
, and A4
2
dominates A4
1
, A2
1
, and A2
2
(c) A3
1
dominates A3
2
, A1
1
, and A1
2
, and A4
2
dominates A4
1
, A2
1
, and A2
2
Proof. For this proof, let T = {t ∈ T : t0 = B0
1
} and T = {t ∈ T : t0 = B0
2
}.
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For sufficiency, suppose player 1 has strategic complements. As case 1, suppose there
exists tˆ ∈ T , there exists sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ) such that sˆ0 = A0
2
. Then lemma 3(2) implies
that action A3
1
dominates action A3
2
for player 1 in subgame 3. Moreover, by lemma 1
and lemma 3(2), whenever player 2 plays B0
1
in the first-stage game, player 1 chooses to
reach subgame 3 over subgame 1, and then to play A3
1
in subgame 3, regardless of player
2 choice in the second-stage game. Therefore, A3
1
dominates A1
1
and A1
2
. Furthermore,
lemma 2(1) implies that for every t ∈ T and s ∈ BR1(t), if t0 = B0
2
, then s0 = A0
2
, and
therefore, lemma 3(3) implies that action A4
2
dominates action A4
1
for player 1 in subgame
4. Reasoning as above, A4
2
dominates A2
1
and A2
2
, and therefore, statement 2(c) holds.
As case 2, suppose for every tˆ ∈ T , for every sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ), sˆ = A0
1
. Then lemma 3(1)
implies that action A1
1
dominates A1
2
for player 1 in subgame 1, and reasoning as above,
it follows that A1
1
dominates A3
1
and A3
2
in subgame 3. Now consider T . As subcase 1,
suppose there exists t˜ ∈ T , there exists s˜ ∈ BR1(t˜) such that s˜0 = A0
1
. Then lemma 3(4)
implies that action A2
2
dominates A2
1
for player 1 in subgame 2, and that A2
2
dominates
A4
1
and A4
2
. Therefore, statement 2(a) holds. As subcase 2, suppose for every t˜ ∈ T , for
every s˜ ∈ BR1(t˜), s˜0 = A0
2
. Then lemma 3(3) implies that action A4
2
dominates A4
1
, and
that A4
2
dominates A2
1
and A2
2
in subgame 2. Therefore, statement 2(b) holds.
The reasoning above shows that one of the statements 2(a), 2(b), or 2(c) holds. It
is easy to check that no more than one statement holds, because the statements are
mutually exclusive. (In particular, A2
2
dominates A4
2
implies A4
2
does not dominate A2
2
,
A1
1
dominates A3
1
implies that A3
1
does not dominate A1
1
, and so on.)
For necessity, suppose exactly one of 2(a), 2(b), or 2(c) holds. Suppose statement 2(a)
holds. In this case, A1
1
dominates A1
2
, A3
1
, and A3
2
implies that for every t ∈ T , player 1
chooses to reach subgame 1 over subgame 3 and to play A1
1
in subgame 1. In other words,
for every t ∈ T , player 1’s best response is given by
BR1(t) = {(A0
1
, A1
1
, s2, s3, s4) ∈ S : sn ∈ {An
1
, An
2
}, n = 2, 3, 4}.
Notice that this is a sublattice of S. Similarly, A2
2
dominates A2
1
, A4
1
, and A4
2
implies that
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for every t ∈ T , player 1 chooses to reach subgame 2 over subgame 4, and to play A2
2
in
subgame 2. In other words, for every t ∈ T , player 1’s best response is given by
BR1(t) = {(A0
1
, s1, A2
2
, s3, s4) ∈ S : sn ∈ {An
1
, An
2
}, n = 1, 3, 4}.
Notice that this is a sublattice of S as well.
Now consider arbitrary tˆ, t˜ ∈ T such that tˆ  t˜. If tˆ0 = t˜0, then BR1(tˆ) = BR1(t˜),
and therefore, BR1(tˆ) ⊑ BR1(t˜). And if tˆ0 = B0
1
and t˜0 = B0
2
, then it is easy to check
that BR1(tˆ) ⊑ BR1(t˜). Thus, player 1 exhibits strategic complements.
The cases where statement 2(b) or 2(c) holds are proved similarly.
As shown before the statement of theorem 1, it is easy to write the conditions in
statements 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) in terms of the corresponding payoffs, and these conditions
are easy to satisfy (see proof of theorem 2 below). Therefore, this characterization yields
uncountably many examples of two stage, 2 × 2 games with strategic complements. For
reference, the motivating example in the previous section satisfies statement 2(a) of the
theorem. Moreover, changing the index of player 1 and player 2 and following the same
logic as above, a similar characterization holds for player 2 to have strategic complements.
The three cases described by conditions 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) can be seen graphically
in the following figures.
Condition 2(a) is represented in figure 3 as case 1. As shown in the upper panel, if
player 2 plays B0
1
in stage 1, then subgame 1 or 3 may be reached in stage 2, and A1
1
dominates A1
2
, A3
1
, A3
2
implies that player 1 will play A0
1
in stage 1 and A1
1
in stage 2, as
necessitated by lemma 3 as well. In particular, all actions for player 1 in subgames 2, 3,
and 4 are a part of the best response of player 1 to any strategy of player 2 that plays B0
1
.
If player 2 switches to a higher strategy B0
2
in stage 1, then for the best response set of
player 1 to move higher in the lattice set order, it cannot be that only the lower response
in subgames 2, 3, and 4 is in the best response set. As subgame 3 is no longer on the
15
Figure 3: Theorem 1, Case 1
path of play, both actions of player 1 in subgame 3 are a part of the new best response.
For subgames 2 and 4, either both actions must be part of the best response or only the
higher action. Lemma 3 (using differential payoffs to outcomes) necessitates this to be
A2
2
in subgame 2, and therefore, both A4
1
and A4
2
in subgame 4 may be part of the best
response. This is shown in the lower panel.
Similarly, condition 2(b) is represented in figure 4 as case 2, and condition 2(c) is
represented in figure 5 as case 3.
As shown by the discussion before the statement of theorem 1, the conditions in
theorem 1 are open conditions. This can be used to generate open sets of payoffs with
strategic complements. In this sense, games with strategic complements (increasing best
responses) lie in open neighborhoods of games with strategic complements. Moreover,
this helps to show that the set of games with strategic complements is large in the sense
of infinite Lebesgue measure, as follows.
16
Figure 4: Theorem 1, Case 2
Figure 5: Theorem 1, Case 3
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Theorem 2. In the set of all two stage, 2×2 games, the set of games that satisfy strategic
complements has infinite (Lebesgue) measure.
Proof. The statement follows, because the set of games that satisfy each of the condi-
tions 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) in theorem 1 has infinite (Lebesgue) measure. For example,
in condition 2(a), A1
1
dominates A1
2
, A3
1
, and A3
2
is equivalent to a1
1
> a1
3
, a1
2
> a1
4
, and
min{a1
1
, a1
2
} > max{a3
1
, a3
2
, a3
3
, a3
4
}, and A2
2
dominates A2
1
, A4
1
, and A4
2
is equivalent to
a2
3
> a2
1
, a2
4
> a2
2
, and min{a2
3
, a2
4
} > max{a4
1
, a4
2
, a4
3
, a4
4
}. Therefore, the set of payoffs
satisfying condition 2(a) includes the following set.
(a1
1
, a1
2
, a1
3
, a1
4
) ∈ (20,+∞)× (15, 16)× (13, 14)× (10, 11) ⊂ R4
(a2
1
, a2
2
, a2
3
, a2
4
) ∈ (10, 11)× (13, 14)× (15, 16)× (20,+∞) ⊂ R4
(a3
1
, a3
2
, a3
3
, a3
4
) ∈ (0, 1)× (2, 3)× (5, 6)× (8, 9) ⊂ R4
(a4
1
, a4
2
, a4
3
, a4
4
) ∈ (0, 1)× (2, 3)× (5, 6)× (8, 9) ⊂ R4
The product of these sets has infinite Lebesgue measure in R16. Therefore, the set of
games satisfying condition 2(a) has infinite measure. Consequently, the set of games in
which player 1 has strategic complements has infinite measure. Similarly, it can be shown
that the set of games in which player 2 has strategic complements has infinite measure.
Taken together, this shows that the set of games with strategic complements has infinite
(Lebesgue) measure.
The measurable rectangle constructed in the proof above has minimum side length of
one unit. It is easy to see that the example may be modified to construct a rectangle with
minimum side length that is arbitrarily large.
Theorem 2 may be extended to include subgame strategic complements as follows. A
two stage, 2× 2 game satisfies subgame strategic complements , if it exhibits strategic
complements, and in each of the four 2× 2 subgames in stage 2, the best response of each
player is increasing (in the lattice set order) in the other player’s strategy.
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Corollary 1. In the set of all two stage, 2×2 games, the set of games that satisfy subgame
strategic complements has infinite (Lebesgue) measure.
Proof. Consider the infinite measure set constructed in the proof of theorem 2 and notice
that the construction satisfies subgame strategic complements. In particular, games with
payoffs in that set have the property that for player 1, action A1
1
, A2
2
, A3
2
, and A4
2
are
dominant in stage two subgames 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. A similar statement holds for
player 2. Taking these two statements together yields the result for games with strategic
complements.
Finally, the next theorem follows immediately by noting that subgame strategic com-
plements implies increasing extended best response correspondences, as used in Echenique
(2004), and to apply his corresponding result.
Theorem 3. In every two stage, 2× 2 game with subgame strategic complements, the set
of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice.
Proof. Apply theorem 9 in Echenique (2004) by noting that its proof only requires nonempty,
increasing best responses in every subgame, which is satisfied here.
4 Comparison to Echenique (2004)
Echenique (2004) defines an extensive form game with strategic complementarities as an
extensive form game in which each player’s payoff function satisfies quasisupermodularity
(in own strategy) and single crossing property in (own strategy; other players’ strategy)
in all subgames. For consistency in comparison, we shall first restrict the definition to the
overall game and then include stage two subgames.
Player 1 payoff function u1 : S × T → R is quasisupermodular (in s), if for every
t ∈ T and for every s, s′ ∈ S, u1(s ∧ s
′, t) < (≤) u1(s, t) =⇒ u1(s
′, t) < (≤) u1(s ∨ s
′, t).
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Player 1 payoff function u1 : S × T → R satisfies single crossing property in (s; t),
if for all t, t′ ∈ T such that t ≺ t′ and for all s, s′ ∈ S such that s ≺ s′, u1(s, t) < (≤
) u1(s
′, t) =⇒ u1(s, t
′) < (≤) u1(s
′, t′). These are defined similarly for player 2 payoff
function u2. A two stage, 2 × 2 game satisfies E-payoff complementarity (short for
payoff complementarities as used in Echenique (2004)), if the payoff function of each
player is quasisupermodular in own strategy and satisfies single crossing property in (own
strategy; other player strategy).
In order to state the following lemma, it is useful to recall when an action weakly
dominates another action in a given subgame. For n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and for k, ℓ ∈ {1, 2},
action An
k
weakly dominates action An
ℓ
, if regardless of which action player 2 plays
in subgame n, playing action An
k
in subgame n gives player 1 a weakly higher payoff than
An
ℓ
. This definition shows that a statement like A2
1
weakly dominates A2
2
is equivalent to
a2
1
≥ a2
3
and a2
2
≥ a2
4
.
Lemma 4. Consider a two stage, 2×2 game that satisfies E-payoff complementarity. For
player 1,
(1) A2
1
weakly dominates A2
2
, and A2
2
weakly dominates A2
1
(2) A3
1
weakly dominates A3
2
, and A3
2
weakly dominates A3
1
Proof. For the first statement, consider the following strategies: sˆ = (A0
1
, A1
1
, A2
2
, A3
1
, A4
1
),
s˜ = (A0
2
, A1
1
, A2
1
, A3
1
, A4
1
), tˆ = (B0
2
, B1
1
, B2
2
, B3
1
, B4
1
), and t˜ = (B0
2
, B1
1
, B2
1
, B3
1
, B4
1
). In this
case, u1(sˆ ∨ s˜, tˆ) = a
4
1
= u1(s˜, tˆ), and therefore, quasisupermodularity implies a
2
4
=
u1(sˆ, tˆ) ≤ u1(sˆ ∧ s˜, tˆ) = a
2
2
. Moreover, u1(sˆ ∨ s˜, t˜) = a
4
1
= u1(s˜, t˜), and therefore, qua-
sisupermodularity implies a2
3
= u1(sˆ, t˜) ≤ u1(sˆ ∧ s˜, t˜) = a
2
1
. This shows that A2
1
weakly
dominates A2
2
.
For the other part, consider the following strategies: sˆ = (A0
1
, A1
1
, A2
1
, A3
1
, A4
1
), s˜ =
(A0
1
, A1
1
, A2
2
, A3
1
, A4
1
), tˆ = (B0
1
, B1
1
, B2
1
, B3
1
, B4
1
), and t˜ = (B0
2
, B1
1
, B2
1
, B3
1
, B4
1
). Notice that
sˆ ≺ s˜ and tˆ ≺ t˜. In this case, u1(sˆ, tˆ) = a
1
1
= u1(s˜, tˆ), and therefore, single crossing
property implies a2
1
= u1(sˆ, t˜) ≤ u1(s˜, t˜) = a
2
3
. Now consider the same sˆ and s˜, and the
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following tˆ = (B0
1
, B1
1
, B2
2
, B3
1
, B4
1
) and t˜ = (B0
2
, B1
1
, B2
2
, B3
1
, B4
1
). Again, notice that sˆ ≺ s˜
and tˆ ≺ t˜. In this case, u1(sˆ, tˆ) = a
1
1
= u1(s˜, tˆ), and therefore, single crossing property
implies a2
2
= u1(sˆ, t˜) ≤ u1(s˜, t˜) = a
2
4
. This shows that A2
2
weakly dominates A2
1
.
The second statement is proved similarly.
Statement 1 shows that a2
1
= a2
3
and a2
2
= a2
4
, and therefore, in every two stage,
2×2 game, quasisupermodular and single crossing property require that player 1 must be
indifferent between actions A2
1
and A2
2
in subgame 2, essentially eliminating any strategic
role for player 1 actions in subgame 2. Statement 2 shows that player 1 must be indifferent
between actions A3
1
and A3
2
in subgame 3, eliminating a strategic role for player 1 actions
in subgame 3. A similar lemma holds for player 2. This yields the following theorem.
Theorem 4. (1) In the set of two stage, 2×2 games with differential payoffs to outcomes,
the set of games that satisfy E-payoff complementarity is empty.
(2) In the set of all two stage, 2× 2 games, the set of games that satisfy E-payoff comple-
mentarity has (Lebesgue) measure zero.
Proof. For the first statement, if a game satisfies E-payoff complementarity, then lemma
4(1) shows that a2
1
= a2
3
and a2
2
= a2
4
, contradicting differential payoffs to outcomes.
The second statement follows, because the set of games with differential payoffs to
outcomes has full (Lebesgue) measure and the first statement here shows that the set of
games satisfying E-payoff complementarity lies in the complement of this set.
Theorem 4 may be extended to include complementarity in subgames, as follows. A
two stage, 2 × 2 game satisfies subgame E-payoff complementarity , if it satisfies E-
payoff complementarity, and in each of the four 2 × 2 subgames in stage 2, the payoff
function of each player is quasisupermodular in own strategy and satisfies single crossing
property in (own strategy; other player strategy). This coincides with the definition in
Echenique (2004).
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Corollary 2. (1) In the set of two stage, 2×2 games with differential payoffs to outcomes,
the set of games that satisfy subgame E-payoff complementarity is empty.
(2) In the set of all two stage, 2×2 games, the set of games that satisfy subgame E-payoff
complementarity has (Lebesgue) measure zero.
Proof. Each statement follows by noting that a game with subgame E-payoff comple-
mentarity is a game with E-payoff complementarity and then apply the corresponding
statement in theorem 4.
The robustness conclusions may be stated in terms of open and closed sets. That
is, the closure of the complement of the set on which quasisupermodularity and single
crossing property hold is the entire space of games, and games with strategic complements
are found in open neighborhoods of games with strategic complements. Similarly, we
may normalize payoffs to lie in the closed unit ball in R16 with measure normalized to
1 and use a probabilistic interpretation. Almost surely there is no game with E-payoff
complementarity, and there is always a positive probability of finding games with strategic
complements near each other.
As is well known, in one shot 2×2matrix games, the role of strategic complements may
be larger, because a 2×2 matrix game with strategic substitutes may be transformed into
a game with strategic complements by reversing the order on the actions of one player. In
other words, it is useful to know if our results remain true when we include the larger set
of payoffs that include those sufficient for strategic substitutes. We show this is indeed
the case. Strategic substitutes is typically formalized using dual single crossing property
on payoffs (a weaker form of quasisubmodularity). We show below (lemma 5 and theorem
5) that even if we include payoffs with dual single crossing property, the set of games with
these payoffs has measure zero, but the set of games in which best responses are either
increasing or decreasing has infinite measure.
Player 1 payoff u1 : S × T → R satisfies dual single crossing property in (s; t),
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if for all t, t′ ∈ T such that t ≺ t′ and for all s, s′ ∈ S such that s ≺ s′, u1(s
′, t) < (≤
) u1(s, t) =⇒ u1(s
′, t′) < (≤) u1(s, t
′). Player 1 has payoff substitutes , if u1 is qua-
sisupermodular in s and satisfies dual single crossing property in (s; t). For completeness,
say that player 1 has strategic substitutes , if best response of player 1 is decreasing in
player 2 strategies in the lattice set order. It is well known that payoff substitutes is a
sufficient condition for strategic substitutes (see, for example, Roy and Sabarwal (2010)).
We may define the same concepts for player 2 analogously.
Payoff substitutes restricts the strategic role of player actions in particular subgames
as follows.
Lemma 5. In a two stage, 2× 2 game, if player 1 has payoff substitutes, then
(1) A1
1
weakly dominates A1
2
, and A1
2
weakly dominates A1
1
, and
(2) A4
1
weakly dominates A4
2
, and A4
2
weakly dominates A4
1
.
Proof. For the first statement, consider the following strategies: sˆ = (A0
1
, A1
2
, A2
1
, A3
1
, A4
1
),
s˜ = (A0
2
, A1
1
, A2
1
, A3
1
, A4
1
), tˆ = (B0
1
, B1
2
, B2
1
, B3
1
, B4
1
), and t˜ = (B0
1
, B1
1
, B2
1
, B3
1
, B4
1
). In this
case, u1(sˆ ∨ s˜, tˆ) = a
3
1
= u1(s˜, tˆ), and therefore, quasisupermodularity implies a
1
4
=
u1(sˆ, tˆ) ≤ u1(sˆ ∧ s˜, tˆ) = a
1
2
. Moreover, u1(sˆ ∨ s˜, t˜) = a
3
1
= u1(s˜, t˜), and therefore, qua-
sisupermodularity implies a1
3
= u1(sˆ, t˜) ≤ u1(sˆ ∧ s˜, t˜) = a
1
1
. This shows that A1
1
weakly
dominates A1
2
.
For the other part, consider the following strategies: sˆ = (A0
1
, A1
1
, A2
1
, A3
1
, A4
1
), s˜ =
(A0
1
, A1
2
, A2
1
, A3
1
, A4
1
), tˆ = (B0
1
, B1
1
, B2
1
, B3
1
, B4
1
), and t˜ = (B0
2
, B1
1
, B2
1
, B3
1
, B4
1
). Notice that
sˆ ≺ s˜ and tˆ ≺ t˜. In this case, u1(sˆ, t˜) = a
2
1
= u1(s˜, t˜), and therefore, dual single crossing
property implies a1
1
= u1(sˆ, tˆ) ≤ u1(s˜, tˆ) = a
1
3
. Now consider the same sˆ and s˜, and
the following tˆ = (B0
1
, B1
2
, B2
1
, B3
1
, B4
1
) and t˜ = (B0
2
, B1
2
, B2
1
, B3
1
, B4
1
). Again, notice that
sˆ ≺ s˜ and tˆ ≺ t˜. In this case, u1(sˆ, t˜) = a
2
1
= u1(s˜, t˜), and therefore, dual single crossing
property implies a1
2
= u1(sˆ, tˆ) ≤ u1(s˜, tˆ) = a
1
4
. This shows that A1
2
weakly dominates A1
1
.
The second statement is proved similarly.
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Statement 1 shows that a1
1
= a1
3
and a1
2
= a1
4
, and therefore, in every two stage, 2× 2
game, quasisupermodular and dual single crossing property require that player 1 must be
indifferent between actions A1
1
and A1
2
in subgame 1, essentially eliminating any strategic
role for player 1 actions in subgame 1. Statement 2 shows that player 1 must be indifferent
between actions A4
1
and A4
2
in subgame 4, eliminating a strategic role for player 1 actions
in subgame 4.
A two stage, 2× 2 game is a payoff monotone game , if for each i ∈ {1, 2}, player i
payoff satisfies either E-payoff complementarity or payoff substitutes. It is a monotone
game , if for each i ∈ {1, 2}, either player i has strategic complements or player i has
strategic substitutes. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. In the set of all two stage, 2× 2 games,
1. The set of monotone games has infinite (Lebesgue) measure, and
2. The set of payoff monotone games has (Lebesgue) measure zero.
Proof. For statement (1), theorem 2 shows that the condition player i has strategic com-
plements is satisfied on a set of infinite (Lebesgue) measure, and Sabarwal and Vu (2019)
show that the condition player i has strategic substitutes is satisfied on a set of infinite
(Lebesgue) measure. Therefore, their union is a set of infinite (Lebesgue) measure.
For statement (2), lemma 4 shows that the set of payoffs satisfying E-payoff com-
plementarity has (Lebesgue) measure zero and lemma 5 shows that the set of payoffs
satisfying payoff substitutes has (Lebesgue) measure zero. Therefore, their union has
(Lebesgue) measure zero.
5 Three Player, Two Action, Two Stage Game
The restrictiveness of sufficient conditions for complementarity given by quasisupermod-
ularity and single crossing property may be exacerbated with more than two players.
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In this section, we consider the case of three player, two action games played in two
stages. These are denoted 3 × 2 × 2 games. Timing is standard. In stage one, 3 players
(each with two actions) play a simultaneous game. After observing stage one actions
(there are a total of eight possible outcomes in stage one), the three players (each with
two actions) play another simultaneous game in stage two. Payoffs are realized at terminal
nodes after the second stage.
The game tree for this game is given in figure 6. We use the following notation
and terminology. For notational convenience, in each stage, the actions of each player
are labeled L and H, with L ≺ H. For player i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let I0
i
denote the initial
information set for player i in stage 1, represented by dotted lines when needed. For each
of the 8 possible outcomes in stage 1, there is a subgame in stage 2. These are termed
sugbames 1 through 8. For player i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and subgame n ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, In
i
denotes
the information set of player i in subgame n in stage 2, represented by dotted lines when
needed. When there is no confusion, some labels are suppressed due to space constraints.
As usual, a strategy for player i, denoted si, is a function from information sets of
player i to actions available at the particular information set. The set of strategies of
player i is denoted Si. When convenient, we use the notation s−i to denote the profile of
strategies for opponents of player i and S−i for the set of all such profiles.
Player i payoff ui : Si×S−i → R is quasisupermodular (in si), if for every s−i ∈ S−i
and for every si, s
′
i
∈ Si, ui(si ∧ s
′
i
, s−i) < (≤) ui(si, s−i) =⇒ ui(s
′
i
, s−i) < (≤) ui(si ∨
s′
i
, s−i). Player i payoff ui : Si×S−i → R satisfies single crossing property in (si; s−i),
if for all s−i, s
′
−i ∈ S−i such that s−i ≺ s
′
−i and for all si, s
′
i
∈ Si such that si ≺ s
′
i
,
ui(si, s−i) < (≤) ui(s
′
i
, s−i) =⇒ ui(si, s
′
−i) < (≤) ui(s
′
i
, s′−i). Player i satisfies E-
payoff complementarity , if ui is quasisupermodular (in si) and satisfies single crossing
property in (si; s−i). A 3 × 2 × 2 game satisfies E-payoff complementarity , if every
player i satisfies E-payoff complementarity.
An important result here is that the restriction imposed by E-payoff complementarity
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Figure 6: Game Tree For 3× 2× 2 Game
is even more severe than earlier. It rules out any strategic role for a player’s actions in
six of the eight subgames in stage 2.
Theorem 6. (1) In each 3× 2× 2 game, if player 1 satisfies E-payoff complementarity,
then in every subgame 2 through 7, player 1 is indifferent between L and H.
(2) The set of all 3×2×2 games that satisfy E-payoff complementarity lies in R40×R40×
R
40, or equivalently, in R120.
Proof. For statement (1), suppose player 1 satisfies E-payoff complementarity. To prove
the result for subgame 2, let sˆ1 be player 1 strategy given by L at I
0
1
, H in subgame 2, and
an arbitrarily chosen actions in subgame 1 and in every subgame 3 to 8. Let s˜1 be given by
H at I0
1
, L in subgame 2, and the same action as sˆ1 in subgame 1 and in every subgame 3
to 8. For players 2 and 3, let s−1 be given by (L,H) at I
0
−1 and arbitrarily chosen actions
at each information set in each subgame 1 to 8. Subgame 6 is reached on path of play for
(sˆ1 ∨ s˜1, s−1) and for (s˜1, s−1), and as both sˆ1 and s˜1 play the same action in subgame 6,
it follows that u1(sˆ1 ∨ s˜1, s−1) = u1(s˜1, s−1), and therefore, quasisupermodularity implies
u1(sˆ1, s−1) ≤ u1(sˆ1 ∧ s˜1, s−1). As subgame 2 is reached on the path of play for (sˆ1, s−1)
and for (sˆ1∧ s˜1, s−1), the inequality u1(sˆ1, s−1) ≤ u1(sˆ1∧ s˜1, s−1) combined with arbitrary
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choices in s−1 for subgame 2 imply that for player 1, L weakly dominates H in subgame
2.
Let s˜′
1
be given by L at I0
1
and the same action as s˜1 at every information set for player
1 in subgames 1 to 8. Let s′−1 be given by (L,L) at I
0
−1 and the same actions as s−1 at
all information sets for players 2 and 3 in subgames 1 to 8. It is easy to see that s˜′
1
≺ sˆ1
and s′−1 ≺ s−1. Subgame 1 is reached on path of play for (sˆ1, s
′
−1) and for (s˜
′
1
, s′−1) and as
both sˆ1 and s˜
′
1
play the same action in subgame 1, it follows that u1(sˆ1, s
′
−1) = u1(s˜
′
1
, s′−1),
and therefore, single crossing property implies u1(sˆ1, s−1) ≥ u1(s˜
′
1
, s−1). As subgame 2
is reached on the path of play for (sˆ1, s−1) and for (s˜
′
1
, s−1), the inequality u1(sˆ1, s−1) ≥
u1(s˜
′
1
, s−1) combined with arbitrary choices in s−1 for subgame 2 imply that for player 1,
H weakly dominates L in subgame 2.
This shows that player 1 is indifferent between L and H in subgame 2. A similar
construction shows that player 1 is indifferent between L and H in subgames 3 and 4 as
well.
To prove the result for subgame 5, let sˆ1 be player 1 strategy given by H at I
0
1
, L
in subgame 5, and an arbitrarily chosen action in every subgame 1 to 4 and in every
subgame 6 to 8. Let s˜1 be given by L at I
0
1
, H in subgame 5, and the same action as
sˆ1 in every subgame 1 to 4 and in every subgame 6 to 8. For players 2 and 3, let s−1
be given by (L,L) at I0−1, and arbitrarily chosen actions at each information set in each
subgame 1 to 8. Subgame 1 is reached on path of play for (s˜1, s−1) and for (sˆ1 ∧ s˜1, s−1),
and as both sˆ1 and s˜1 play the same action in subgame 1, it follows that u1(sˆ1∧ s˜1, s−1) =
u1(s˜1, s−1), and therefore, quasisupermodularity implies u1(sˆ1, s−1) ≤ u1(sˆ1 ∨ s˜1, s−1). As
subgame 5 is reached on the path of play for (sˆ1, s−1) and for (sˆ1∨ s˜1, s−1), the inequality
u1(sˆ1, s−1) ≤ u1(sˆ1 ∨ s˜1, s−1) combined with arbitrary choices in s−1 for subgame 5 imply
that for player 1, H weakly dominates L in subgame 5.
Let s˜′
1
be given by H at I0
1
and the same action as s˜1 at every subgame 1 to 8. Let s
′
−1
be given by (H,H) at I0−1 and the same actions as s−1 at all information sets for players
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2 and 3 in subgames 1 to 8. It is easy to see that sˆ1 ≺ s˜
′
1
and s−1 ≺ s
′
−1. Subgame 8
is reached on path of play for (sˆ1, s
′
−1) and for (s˜
′
1
, s′−1) and as both sˆ1 and s˜
′
1
play the
same action in subgame 8, it follows that u1(sˆ1, s
′
−1) = u1(s˜
′
1
, s′−1), and therefore, single
crossing property implies u1(sˆ1, s−1) ≥ u1(s˜
′
1
, s−1). As subgame 5 is reached on the path
of play for (sˆ1, s−1) and for (s˜
′
1
, s−1), the inequality u1(sˆ1, s−1) ≥ u1(s˜
′
1
, s−1) combined
with arbitrary choices in s−1 for subgame 5 imply that for player 1, L weakly dominates
H in subgame 5.
This shows that player 1 is indifferent between L and H in subgame 5. A similar
construction shows that player 1 is indifferent between H and L in subgames 6 and 7 as
well. This proves statement (1).
Consider statement (2). Statement (1) implies that player 1 payoff cannot have more
than 40 distinct components (4 for each of six subgames in which player 1 is indifferent
between L and H and 8 in each of the two remaining subgames). Changing the index
for a player and following the same logic as in statement (1) shows that each of player
2 and player 3 must also be indifferent between L and H in six of the eight subgames,
and therefore, player 2 and player 3 payoff cannot have more than 40 distinct components
each. This shows that the set of games that satisfy E-payoff complementarity lies in
R
40 × R40 × R40, or equivalently, in R120.
E-payoff complementarity is not necessary to have increasing best responses in these
games, as shown in the following example. As earlier, player i has strategic comple-
ments , if best response of player i is increasing in opponent strategies in the lattice set
order. A game is a game with strategic complements (GSC), if for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
player i has strategic complements.
Figure 7 presents a 3 × 2 × 2 GSC that does not satisfy E-payoff complementarity
for any player. Payoffs presented at the terminal nodes are for player 1 and player 2.
Player 3 payoffs are symmetric to those of player 2. Notice that player 1 is not indifferent
between L and H in subgames 4, 5, 6, and 7, and therefore, player 1 payoff does not
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Figure 7: A 3x2x2 GSC
satisfy E-payoff complementarity. Nevertheless, player 1 has strategic complements, as
shown by the lemma and theorem below. A similar statement is true for players 2 and 3.
The game in figure 7 may be motivated as follows. Consider an industry with three
firms, firm 1 is large and firms 2 and 3 are small (and symmetric). In each stage, each firm
may compete less aggressively (play L) or more aggressively (play H). Less aggressive
competition may occur, perhaps, by setting high prices and more aggressive competition
may occur, perhaps, by setting low prices. Each firm chooses how to compete in each of
two stages. Outcomes are observed after each stage.
Payoffs for firm 1 in figure 7 may be motivated as follows. Suppose profit of firm 1 is
impacted less with one aggressive competitor and more with two aggressive competitors
and firm 1 is large enough to withstand two aggressive competitors in one stage but not in
both stages. Firm 1 has an incentive to compete less aggressively in the first stage. If both
competitors compete less aggressively as well, it is in firm 1’s best interest to compete
less aggressively in the second stage. If one competitor competes less aggressively and
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the other competes more aggressively, then firm 1 is indifferent between competing less or
more agressively in the second stage. If both competitors compete more aggressively in
the first stage, it is in firm 1’s best interest to compete aggressively in the second stage.
It is not in firm 1’s best interest to compete more aggressively in the first stage. It does
so in the second stage, when forced by widespread competition from its competitors.
Payoffs for firm 2 in figure 7 may be motivated as follows. Firm 2 is small and its profit
is impacted with one aggressive competitor in either stage. Firm 2 has an incentive to
compete less aggressively in the first stage, if both competitors compete less aggressively
in stage one, and in this case, it is in firm 1’s best interest to compete less aggressively
in the second stage as well. If one competitor competes less aggressively in the first stage
and the other competes more aggressively, then firm 2 competes aggressively in stage one
and is indifferent between competing less or more agressively in the second stage. If both
competitors compete more aggressively in the first stage, it is in firm 2’s best interest
to compete aggressively in both stages. Firm 3 is symmetric to firm 2 and its payoff is
motivated similarly.
Another motivation may be given in terms of coordination games. Consider three
friends, and each friend may decide to go to a movie (L) or go to the opera (H). Each
friend makes a decision about which event to go to for each of two weekends. Friend 1
prefers very much to go to a movie (at least once) but would also like the company of
her friends. Friends 2 and 3 like movies but also like opera and would similarly like the
company of others.
Friend 1 has an incentive to go to the movie the first weekend. If the other friends go
to the movie as well, it is in friend 1’s best interest to go to the movie the second weekend.
If one other friend (2 or 3) goes to the movie the first weekend (with friend 1) and the
third friend goes to the opera the first weekend, then friend 1 is indifferent between going
to the movie or opera the second weekend. If both other friends go to the opera the first
weekend, friend 1 is not so well off going alone to the movie the first weekend and chooses
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to go to the opera second weekend. It is not in friend 1’s best interest to go to opera
the first weekend. She does so the second weekend, if her friends decide to go to opera
without her the first weekend.
Similar motivations may be made in terms of other coordination games. For example,
one large depositor may not make a run on a bank (L) on a given day. If it observes both
small depositors make a run on the bank (play (H,H)) on a given day, it is in its interest
to make a run next day. The same thing with runs on groceries or gasoline in a pandemic.
A similar motivation may be made with technology adoption. An entrenched firm (or
department in a firm, or a person) may like to continue using an inferior technology (L)
unless forced by a coordinated move by other firms (or departments within a firm, or
other persons) to use a superior technology (H). These types of situations can exhibit
strategic complements but cannot be modeled with E-payoff complementarity.
The following results show that each player in this game has strategic complements.
Lemma 6. In the game given in figure 7, player 1 best response has the following struc-
ture.
1. For every s−1 ∈ {s−1 ∈ S−1 | s−1(I
0
−1) = (L,L)},
BR1(s−1) = {s1 ∈ S1 | s1(I
0
1
) = L, s1(I
1
1
) = L}.
2. For every s−1 ∈ {s−1 ∈ S−1 | s−1(I
0
−1) = (L,H)},
BR1(s−1) = {s1 ∈ S1 | s1(I
0
1
) = L}.
3. For every s−1 ∈ {s−1 ∈ S−1 | s−1(I
0
−1) = (H,L)},
BR1(s−1) = {s1 ∈ S1 | s1(I
0
1
) = L}.
4. For every s−1 ∈ {s−1 ∈ S−1 | s−1(I
0
−1) = (H,H)},
BR1(s−1) = {s1 ∈ S1 | s1(I
0
1
) = L, s1(I
4
1
) = H}.
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Figure 8: Player 1 Incentives, Case 1
Proof. See Appendix.
Statement (1) is represented in figure 8, statement (2) in figure 9, statement (3) in
figure 10, and statement (4) in figure 11. This lemma is useful to prove that player 1 has
strategic complements.
Theorem 7. In the game given in figure 7, player 1 has strategic complements.
Proof. See Appendix.
A similar argument holds for players 2 and 3.
Lemma 7. In the game given in figure 7, player 2 best response has the following struc-
ture.
1. For every s−2 ∈ {s−2 ∈ S−2 | s−2(I
0
−2) = (L,L)},
BR2(s−2) = {s2 ∈ S2|s2(I
0
2
) = L, s2(I
1
2
) = L}.
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Figure 9: Player 1 Incentives, Case 2
Figure 10: Player 1 Incentives, Case 3
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Figure 11: Player 1 Incentives, Case 4
2. For every s−2 ∈ {s−2 ∈ S−2 | s−2(I
0
−2) = (H,L)},
BR2(s−2) = {s2 ∈ S2|s2(I
0
2
) = H}.
3. For every s−2 ∈ {s−2 ∈ S−2 | s−2(I
0
−2) = (L,H)},
BR2(s−2) = {s2 ∈ S2|s2(I
0
2
) = H}.
4. For every s−2 ∈ {s−2 ∈ S−2 | s−2(I
0
−2) = (H,H)},
BR2(s−2) = {s2 ∈ S2|s2(I
0
2
) = H, s2(I
8
2
) = H}.
Proof. Similar to that of lemma 6.
For reference, statement (1) is presented in figure 12, statement (2) in figure 13,
statement (3) in figure 14, and statement (4) in figure 15. This lemma helps to prove that
player 2 has strategic complements.
Theorem 8. In the game given in figure 7, player 2 has strategic complements.
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Figure 12: Player 2 Incentives, Case 1
Figure 13: Player 2 Incentives, Case 2
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Figure 14: Player 2 Incentives, Case 3
Figure 15: Player 2 Incentives, Case 4
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Proof. Similar to that of theorem 7.
Player 3 is symmetric to player 2 and a similar argument shows that player 3 has
strategic complements. Therefore, this is a game with strategic complements.
More generally, the conditions in six of the eight subgames are open conditions which
may be extended to yield sets of infinite (Lebesgue) measure in the corresponding space.
Theorem 9. The set of 3×2×2 games with strategic complements has infinite (Lebesgue)
measure in R56 × R56 × R56, or equivalently, in R168.
Proof. For player 1, denote their eight payoffs after each second stage subgame n ∈
{1, . . . , 8} by
(πn
1
(L, (L,L)), πn
1
(L, (L,H)), πn
1
(L, (H,L)), πn
1
(L, (H,H))) = (an
1
, an
2
, an
3
, an
4
), and
(πn
1
(H, (L,L)), πn
1
(H, (L,H)), πn
1
(H, (H,L)), πn
1
(H, (H,H))) = (an
5
, an
6
, an
7
, an
8
),
and consider payoffs in the following set of infinite (Lebesgue) measure in R56.
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(a1
1
, a1
2
, a1
3
, a1
4
) ∈ (90,∞)× (80,∞)× (70,∞)× (60,∞) ⊆ R4
(a1
5
, a1
6
, a1
7
, a1
8
) ∈ (40, 45)× (30, 35)× (20, 25)× (10, 15) ⊆ R4
(a2
1
, a2
2
, a2
3
, a2
4
) ∈ (90,∞)× (80,∞)× (70,∞)× (60,∞) ⊆ R4
(a2
5
, a2
6
, a2
7
, a2
8
) = (a2
1
, a2
2
, a2
3
, a2
4
)
(a3
1
, a3
2
, a3
3
, a3
4
) ∈ (90,∞)× (80,∞)× (70,∞)× (60,∞) ⊆ R4
(a3
5
, a3
6
, a3
7
, a3
8
) = (a3
1
, a3
2
, a3
3
, a3
4
)
(a4
1
, a4
2
, a4
3
, a4
4
) ∈ (40, 45)× (30, 35)× (20, 25)× (10, 15) ⊆ R4
(a4
5
, a4
6
, a4
7
, a4
8
) ∈ (90,∞)× (80,∞)× (70,∞)× (60,∞) ⊆ R4
(a5
1
, a5
2
, a5
3
, a5
4
) ∈ (40, 45)× (30, 35)× (20, 25)× (10, 15) ⊆ R4
(a5
5
, a5
6
, a5
7
, a5
8
) ∈ (45, 50)× (35, 40)× (25, 30)× (15, 20) ⊆ R4
(a6
1
, a6
2
, a6
3
, a6
4
) ∈ (45, 50)× (35, 40)× (25, 30)× (10, 15) ⊆ R4
(a6
5
, a6
6
, a6
7
, a6
8
) ∈ (40, 45)× (30, 35)× (20, 25)× (15, 20) ⊆ R4
(a7
1
, a7
2
, a7
3
, a7
4
) ∈ (45, 50)× (35, 40)× (25, 30)× (10, 15) ⊆ R4
(a7
5
, a7
6
, a7
7
, a7
8
) ∈ (40, 45)× (30, 35)× (20, 25)× (15, 20) ⊆ R4
(a8
1
, a8
2
, a8
3
, a8
4
) ∈ (45, 50)× (35, 40)× (25, 30)× (10, 15) ⊆ R4
(a8
5
, a8
6
, a8
7
, a8
8
) ∈ (40, 45)× (30, 35)× (20, 25)× (15, 20) ⊆ R4.
Following the logic in the proof of lemma 6 and theorem 7, it can be shown that for
each collection of player 1 payoffs in the above set of infinite (Lebesgue) measure in R56,
player 1 has strategic complements.
For player 2, denote their eight payoffs after each second stage subgame n ∈ {1, . . . , 8}
by
(πn
2
(L, (L,L)), πn
2
(L, (L,H)), πn
2
(H, (L,L)), πn
2
(H, (L,H)) = (bn
1
, bn
2
, bn
3
, bn
4
) and
(πn
2
(L, (H,L)), πn
2
(L, (L,H)), πn
2
(H, (H,L)), πn
2
(H, (H,H))) = (bn
5
, bn
6
, bn
7
, bn
8
),
and consider payoffs in the following set of infinite (Lebesgue) measure in R56.
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(b1
1
, b1
2
, b1
3
, b1
4
) ∈ (90,∞)× (80,∞)× (40, 45)× (30, 35) ⊆ R4
(b1
5
, b1
6
, b1
7
, b1
8
) ∈ (70,∞)× (60,∞)× (20, 25)× (10, 15) ⊆ R4
(b2
1
, b2
2
, b2
3
, b2
4
) ∈ (45, 50)× (30, 35)× (40, 45)× (35, 40) ⊆ R4
(b2
5
, b2
6
, b2
7
, b2
8
) ∈ (20, 25)× (10, 15)× (25, 30)× (15, 20) ⊆ R4
(b3
1
, b3
2
, b3
3
, b3
4
) ∈ (45, 50)× (30, 35)× (40, 45)× (35, 40) ⊆ R4
(b3
5
, b3
6
, b3
7
, b3
8
) ∈ (20, 25)× (10, 15)× (25, 30)× (15, 20) ⊆ R4
(b4
1
, b4
2
, b4
5
, b4
6
) ∈ (90,∞)× (80,∞)× (70,∞)× (60,∞) ⊆ R4
(b4
3
, b4
4
, b4
7
, b4
8
) = (b4
1
, b4
2
, b4
5
, b4
6
)
(b5
1
, b5
2
, b5
3
, b5
4
) ∈ (45, 50)× (30, 35)× (40, 45)× (35, 40) ⊆ R4
(b5
5
, b5
6
, b5
7
, b5
8
) ∈ (20, 25)× (10, 15)× (25, 30)× (15, 20) ⊆ R4
(b6
1
, b6
2
, b6
3
, b6
4
) ∈ (45, 50)× (30, 35)× (40, 45)× (35, 40) ⊆ R4
(b6
5
, b6
6
, b6
7
, b6
8
) ∈ (20, 25)× (10, 15)× (25, 30)× (15, 20) ⊆ R4
(b7
1
, b7
2
, b7
5
, b7
6
) ∈ (90,∞)× (80,∞)× (70,∞)× (60,∞) ⊆ R4
(b7
3
, b7
4
, b7
7
, b7
8
) = (b7
1
, b7
2
, b7
5
, b7
6
)
(b8
1
, b8
2
, b8
3
, b8
4
) ∈ (40, 45)× (30, 35)× (90,∞)× (80,∞) ⊆ R4
(b8
5
, b8
6
, b8
7
, b8
8
) ∈ (20, 25)× (10, 15)× (70,∞)× (60,∞) ⊆ R4.
Following the logic in the proof of lemma 6 and theorem 7, it can be shown that for each
collection of player 2 payoffs in the above set of infinite (Lebesgue) measure in R56, player
2 has strategic complements. A similar argument holds for player 3. The conclusion
follows because their product is a set of infinite (Lebesgue) measure in R56 × R56 × R56,
or equivalently, in R168.
This is the highest dimensional space in which we are able to formulate such a class
of examples.
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6 Conclusion
We study necessary and sufficient conditions for strategic complements in two stage, 2×2
games.
We find that the restrictiveness imposed by standard sufficient conditions of quasisu-
permodularity and single crossing property is particularly severe, in the sense that the set
of games in which payoffs satisfy these conditions has measure zero. In particular, payoffs
with these conditions require the player to be indifferent between their actions in two of
the four subgames in stage two, eliminating any strategic role for their actions in these
two subgames.
In contrast, the set of games that exhibit strategic complements (increasing best re-
sponses) has infinite measure. Players are not required to be indifferent between their
actions in stage 2 subgames. This enlarges the scope of strategic complements in two
stage, 2×2 games (and provides a basis for possibly greater scope in more general games).
The conditions identified here are easy to verify directly from payoffs, and examples with
several economic motivations show the additional types of interactions that are made
possible with the more general results. The set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the
larger class of games continues to remain a nonempty, complete lattice.
The results are easy to apply, and are robust to including dual payoff conditions and
adding a third player.
The problem of characterizing strategic complements in general extensive form games
is difficult and remains intractable. Some of the difficulties can be seen in our work. Re-
search addressing more general cases (more players, more stages, more actions, continuum
of actions, and so on) would be helpful. As two stage, 2 × 2 games are a basic building
block for multi-stage games and infinitely repeated games, the results here may provide
insight for other researchers to solve more general cases. In particular, our results show
the need to go beyond a direct adaptation of quasisupermodularity and single crossing
40
property in extensive form games.
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7 Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
Proof. Notice first that the assumption of differential payoffs to outcomes has the following
implications for the structure of best responses. For every t ∈ T , and for every sˆ, s˜ ∈
BR1(t), the subgame reached on the path of play for profile (sˆ, t) is the same as the
subgame reached on the path of play for profile (s˜, t). Moreover, the actions played by
each player in the subgame reached on the path of play for profile (sˆ, t) are the same as
the actions played by each player in the subgame reached on the path of play for profile
(s˜, t). Furthermore, every s ∈ S that has the same actions as sˆ on the path of play for
profile (sˆ, t) is also a member of BR1(t).
To prove the lemma, fix tˆ, t˜ ∈ T , sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ), and s˜ ∈ BR1(t˜).
Suppose first that tˆ0 = t˜0 = B0
1
, and suppose that sˆ0 = A0
1
and s˜0 = A0
2
. Notice
that the structure of the best response of player 1 implies that s˜′ = (A0
2
, A1
2
, A2
2
, s˜3, A4
2
) ∈
BR1(t˜). Form t = (B0
2
, t˜1, t˜2, t˜3, t˜4) and consider s ∈ BR1(t). Then t˜  t, and using
strategic complements for player 1, it follows that s˜′∨s ∈ BR1(t). In particular, subgame
4 is reached with profile (s˜′ ∨ s, t), and therefore, s′ = (A0
2
, A1
1
, A2
1
, A3
1
, A4
2
) ∈ BR1(t).
Moreover, t˜  t implies s′ = s′ ∧ s˜′ ∈ BR1(t˜). Notice that on path of play for profile
(s′, t˜), subgame 3 is reached and the action played by player 1 in subgame 3 is A3
1
.
Consider sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ) and notice that the structure of best response of player 1 implies
that sˆ′ = (A0
1
, sˆ1, A2
1
, A3
1
, A4
1
) ∈ BR1(tˆ). Let t = tˆ ∧ t˜ and consider s ∈ BR1(t). As t  tˆ,
strategic complements for player 1 implies that s ∧ sˆ′ ∈ BR1(t). Notice that on path
of play for profile (s ∧ sˆ′, t), subgame 1 is reached, and therefore, the structure of best
response for player 1 implies that s′ = (A0
1
, s1 ∧ sˆ1, A2
2
, A3
2
, A4
2
) ∈ BR1(t). Using t  t˜
and strategic complements for player 1 implies that s′ ∨ s˜′ ∈ BR1(t˜). Notice that on path
of play for profile (s′ ∨ s˜′, t˜), subgame 3 is reached and the action played by player 1 in
subgame 3 is A3
2
. As shown above, this is different from the action played by player 1 on
path of play for profile (s′, t˜), contradicting that both s′ and s′ ∨ s˜′ are best responses of
player 1 to t˜. The case where sˆ0 = A0
2
and s˜0 = A0
1
is proved similarly.
Now suppose tˆ0 = t˜0 = B0
2
, and suppose that sˆ0 = A0
1
and s˜0 = A0
2
. As subgame 2 is
reached on path of play for profile (sˆ, tˆ), it follows that sˆ′ = (A0
1
, A1
1
, sˆ2, A3
1
, A4
1
) ∈ BR1(tˆ).
Form t = (B0
1
, tˆ1, tˆ2, tˆ3, tˆ4) and consider s ∈ BR1(t). Then t  tˆ, and using strategic
complements for player 1, it follows that sˆ′ ∧ s ∈ BR1(t). In particular, subgame 1 is
reached with profile (s∧sˆ′, t), and therefore, s′ = (A0
1
, A1
1
, A2
2
, A3
2
, A4
1
) ∈ BR1(t). Moreover,
t  tˆ implies s′ = s′ ∨ sˆ′ ∈ BR1(tˆ). Notice that on path of play for profile (s′, tˆ), subgame
2 is reached and the action played by player 1 in subgame 2 is A2
2
.
Consider s˜ ∈ BR1(t˜) and notice that the structure of best response of player 1 implies
that s˜′ = (A0
2
, A1
2
, A2
2
, A3
2
, s˜4) ∈ BR1(t˜). Let t = tˆ ∨ t˜ and consider s ∈ BR1(t). As t˜  t,
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strategic complements for player 1 implies that s˜′ ∨ s ∈ BR1(t). Notice that on path
of play for profile (s˜′ ∨ s, t), subgame 4 is reached, and therefore, the structure of best
response for player 1 implies that s′ = (A0
2
, A1
1
, A2
1
, A3
1
, s4 ∨ s˜4) ∈ BR1(t). Using tˆ  t
and strategic complements for player 1 implies that sˆ′ ∧ s′ ∈ BR1(tˆ). Notice that on path
of play for profile (sˆ′ ∧ s′, tˆ), subgame 2 is reached and the action played by player 1 in
subgame 2 is A2
1
. This is different from the action played by player 1 on path of play for
profile (s′, tˆ), contradicting that both s′ and sˆ′∧s′ are best responses of player 1 to tˆ. The
case where sˆ0 = A0
2
and s˜0 = A0
1
is proved similarly.
Proof of lemma 2
Proof. Notice that the assumption of differential payoffs to outcomes implies the following
about the structure of best responses: For every t ∈ T , and for every sˆ, s˜ ∈ BR1(t),
sˆ0 = s˜0. To prove statement (1), fix tˆ ∈ T and sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ) such that tˆ0 = B0
1
and sˆ0 = A0
2
.
Form t = (B0
1
, B1
1
, B2
1
, B3
1
, B4
1
) ∈ T and let s ∈ BR1(t). Then by the previous lemma,
s0 = sˆ0 = A0
2
. Now fix arbitrarily t ∈ T and s ∈ BR1(t). As t  t, strategic complements
implies that s ∨ s ∈ BR1(t). As s0 = A0
2
, it follows that (s ∨ s)0 = A0
2
. Finally, as noted
above, differential payoffs implies that s0 = (s ∨ s)0 = A0
2
, as desired. Statement (2) is
proved similarly.
Proof of lemma 3
Proof. To prove statement (1), fix tˆ ∈ T and sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ) such that tˆ0 = B0
1
and sˆ0 = A0
1
.
Fix arbitrarily t ∈ T , s ∈ BR1(t) such that t0 = B0
1
. By lemma 1, s0 = A0
1
, and therefore,
s′ = (A0
1
, s1, A2
1
, A3
1
, A4
1
) ∈ BR1(t). Let t = (B0
2
, t1, t2, t3, t4) ∈ T and s ∈ BR1(t).
Structure of best responses implies that s′ = (s0, A1
1
, s2, A3
1
, s4) ∈ BR1(t). Moreover, t  t
and strategic complements implies that s′ ∧ s′ ∈ BR1(t) and consequently, structure of
best responses implies that s1 = (s′ ∧ s′)1 = A1
1
.
To prove statement (2), fix tˆ ∈ T and sˆ ∈ BR1(tˆ) such that tˆ0 = B0
1
and sˆ0 = A0
2
. Fix
arbitrarily t ∈ T , s ∈ BR1(t) such that t0 = B0
1
. By lemma 1, s0 = A0
2
, and therefore,
s′ = (A0
2
, A1
2
, A2
2
, s3, A4
2
) ∈ BR1(t). Let t = (B0
2
, t1, t2, t3, t4) ∈ T and s ∈ BR1(t). By
previous lemma, s0 = A0
2
, and therefore, s′ = (A0
2
, A1
1
, A2
1
, A3
1
, s4) ∈ BR1(t). Moreover,
t  t and strategic complements imply that (A0
2
, A1
1
, A2
1
, A3
1
, A4
2
∧ s4) = s′ ∧ s′ ∈ BR1(t)
and consequently, structure of best responses implies that s3 = (s′ ∧ s′)3 = A3
1
.
Statements (3) and (4) are proved similarly.
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Proof of lemma 6
Proof. For statement (1), consider profile s−1 in which players 2 and 3 play (L,L) in
stage 1, that is, s−1(I
0
−1) = (L,L). If player 1 chooses L in first stage, then subgame 1
is reached, and playing L in subgame 1 is a dominant strategy for player 1. If player 1
chooses H in first stage, then subgame 5 is reached, and player 1 payoffs after subgame
5 are dominated by player 1 payoffs after subgame 1. Therefore, L dominates H in first
stage. Similar arguments may be made for statements (2), (3), and (4).
Proof of theorem 7
Proof. We want to show that for every s−1, s
′
−1 ∈ S−1 with s−1 ≺ s
′
−1, BR1(s−1) ⊑
BR1(s
′
−1). Pick arbitrarily s−1 ∈ S−1.
As case 1, suppose s−1 ∈ {s−1 | s−1(I
0
−1) = (L,L)}. Then statement (1) of lemma 6
shows that BR1(s−1) = {s1 ∈ S1 | s1(I
0
1
) = L, s1(I
1
1
) = L}. Pick arbitrarily s′−1 ∈ S−1
such that s−1 ≺ s
′
−1. If s
′
−1 ∈ {s−1 | s−1(I
0
−1) = (L,L)}, then statement (1) of lemma 6
shows that BR1(s−1) = BR1(s
′
−1), and therefore, BR1(s−1) ⊑ BR1(s
′
−1). If s
′
−1 ∈ {s−1 |
s−1(I
0
−1) = (L,H)}, then statement (2) of lemma 6 shows that BR1(s
′
−1) = {s1 ∈ S1 |
s1(I
0
1
) = L}, and it is easy to check that BR1(s−1) ⊑ BR1(s
′
−1). If s
′
−1 ∈ {s−1 | s−1(I
0
−1) =
(H,L)}, then statement (3) of lemma 6 shows that BR1(s
′
−1) = {s1 ∈ S1 | s1(I
0
1
) = L},
and it is easy to check that BR1(s−1) ⊑ BR1(s
′
−1). If s
′
−1 ∈ {s−1 | s−1(I
0
−1) = (H,H)},
then statement (4) of lemma 6 shows that BR1(s
′
−1) = {s1 ∈ S1 | s1(I
0
1
) = L, s1(I
4
1
) = H},
and it is easy to check that BR1(s−1) ⊑ BR1(s
′
−1).
As case 2, suppose s−1 ∈ {s−1 | s−1(I
0
−1) = (L,H)}. Then statement (1) of lemma
6 shows that BR1(s−1) = {s1 ∈ S1 | s1(I
0
1
) = L}. Pick arbitrarily s′−1 ∈ S−1 such that
s−1 ≺ s
′
−1. Then it cannot be that s
′
−1(I
0
−1) = (L,L) or s
′
−1(I
0
−1) = (H,L). If s
′
−1 ∈ {s−1 |
s−1(I
0
−1) = (L,H)}, then BR1(s−1) = BR1(s
′
−1), and if s
′
−1 ∈ {s−1 | s−1(I
0
−1) = (H,H)},
then it is easy to check that BR1(s−1) ⊑ BR1(s
′
−1).
The cases where s−1 ∈ {s−1 | s−1(I
0
−1) = (H,L)} and s−1 ∈ {s−1 | s−1(I
0
−1) = (H,H)}
are analyzed similarly.
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